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TAX SHELTER AS A SECURITY: THE USE OF
TAX RETURNS IN A 10b-5 ACTION
I. Introduction
For many investors, the reduction in tax liability during the early
years of a tax shelter investment' is the primary motivation for
choosing this type of investment over others that merely offer the
promise of future profits. 2 This reduction in tax liability represents
an immediate "tangible economic benefit" 3 to the investor despite
4
the delay in the return of profits on the investment.
Where the investment fails to produce the promised return in later
years, and the failure can be traced to fraud in the offering memorandum or prospectus, the investor has a right to relief under the
1. A tax shelter is "a transaction which accelerates tax benefits into current
periods and defers the burden of tax repayment as far into the future as possible."
R. HAFT & P. FASS, 1984 TAX SHELTERED INVESTMENTS HANDBOOK 2-2 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as HAFT & FASS]. In addition, it is hoped that the investment
will generate profits in later years. B. BITTKER, L. STONE, & W. KLEIN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 648 (6th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as BITTKER & STONE]; see
Weisner, Tax Shelters-A Survey of the Impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
33 TAX L. REV. 5, 6-8 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Weisner]. "The common
characteristic of a tax shelter is the generation of tax losses which are available
as deductions under the present tax laws, not only against the income from the
tax shelter, but also against the taxpayer's income from other sources." Weisner,
supra, at 6. In a real estate tax shelter, the taxpayer can create even greater losses
through the use of leveraging, that is, nonrecourse financing which increases the
amount of his deductions far above his initial investment. See id. at 54-56 for a
discussion of real estate tax shelters under the 1976 Tax Act.
The purpose of deferral is to "[push] income into the future by incurring costs
that are currently deductible and receiving the corresponding return from the
investment in some future year." BITTKER & STONE, supra, at 648. Conversion
allows the taxpayer to convert ordinary income into capital gains, which are taxed
at a more favorable rate. Ordinary income becomes capital gain upon sale or
exchange of the tax shelter interest if held for over six months. I.R.C. § 1222(4)
(1985). The portion of the gain attributable to accelerated deductions which reduced
ordinary income is taxed as capital gains. Weisner, supra, at 7. This is highly
favorable to the taxpayer because 60% of the amount of the net capital gain is
a deduction from gross income. I.R.C. § 1202(a) (1985). Thus, although income
from the investment may not be recognized for some time, see HAFT & FASS,
supra, at 2-2, the investor receives a "tangible economic benefit." Austin v.
Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 182 (8th Cir. 1982).
2. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 173-74 (8th Cir. 1982).
3. Id. at 182.
4. HAFT & FASS, supra note 1, at 2-2. "[A] tax benefit dollar is worth just
as much as an investment return dollar, and tax benefits can make an investment
financially attractive where plainly it would not be but for those benefits." BITTKER
& STONE, supra note 10, at 653; see also Weisner, supra note 1, at 6 ("Many
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federal securities laws.' Nevertheless, an injured tax shelter investor
remains in a better financial position than victims of other types
of securities fraud.6 An individual who purchases securities in anticipation of later profits, and subsequently discovers that he has
been defrauded, gains nothing of value from the investment.' In
contrast, a tax shelter investor, while having no prospects of future
income from the investment, has achieved something in the short
run: he has reduced his tax liability by the amount of his investment.8
In addition, like other securities investors, he still retains the option
to sue for damages caused by the fraudulent sale of securities. 9
Although this difference has been given judicial recognition, 0 the
amount of consideration that the trier of fact should allocate to
this benefit during the course of a lawsuit remains in dispute.' In
such a cause of action for fraudulent sale of a tax shelter investment,
the investor's tax status is relevant 12 in determining whether he has
a valid cause of action 3 and whether he has sustained any actual
damages. 4 If the defendant can prove that because of the unique
aspects of a tax shelter the tax benefit outweighed any losses, the
plaintiff will have failed to establish grounds for relief. This ininvestors enter into tax shelters to reduce the tax liability on their unrelated income").
5. A tax shelter is viewed as a security. See infra note 20. Individuals who
are injured as a result of securities laws violations are granted the right to relief
via the private cause of action under the federal securities laws. See infra notes
26-29 and accompanying text.
6. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 182 (8th Cir. 1982).
7. Id. at 182.
8. Id. at 182; see Note, Real Estate Limited Partnerships and Allocational
Efficiency: The Incentive to Sue for Securities Fraud, 63 VA. L. Rav. 669, 67273 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Incentive to Sue].
9. See infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the right
to a private cause of action for securities fraud.
10. William Z. Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984);
Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D.
437 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Bridgen v. Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
11. See Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 768 F.2d 949 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S.
Ct. 379 (1985) (Austin I); Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 767 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir.
1985); William Z. Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984);
Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1982) (Austin 1) (allowing deduction
of tax benefit from damages award, remanding for determination of damages).
But see Burgess v. Premier, Corp., 727 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1984) (denying deduction
of tax benefit from the damage award); Western Federal Corp. v. Davis, 553 F.
Supp. 818 (D. Ariz. 1982) (disallowing deduction).
12. See infra notes 70-105 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 43-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements
of the cause of action.
14. See infra notes 111-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of actual
damages under the securities laws.
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formation, in its clearest form, is contained in the individual's tax
returns. 5 Compelling an individual to disclose his tax returns, however, conflicts with the public policy favoring confidentiality.1 6 The
qualified privilege resulting from the public policy can be overcome
in "appropriate circumstances,' ' 7 that is, when a party has put
income at issue.' 8
This Note will explore the relevant policy considerations indicating
that use of the plaintiff's tax returns in determining whether a cause
of action has been established and, if so, the amount of damages
incurred, if any, serves the purpose underlying the creation of the
private cause of action for securities fraud under federal law.' 9 This
Note will proceed by examining the elements of a cause of action
under Rule lOb-5, 20 the liberal discovery rules which favor allowing
use of plaintiff's tax returns, 2' and the theories of damages under
15. William E. Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984);
Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 182-84 (8th Cir. 1982); Dupuy v. Dupuy,
551 F.2d 1005, 1025 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Beaty v. Basic
Resources Int'l, No. 81 Civ. 6189 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1985) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Cases file).
16. Premier Service Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 229 (9th
Cir. 1975). "[A] public policy against unnecessary public disclosure arises from the
need, if the tax laws are to function properly, to encourage taxpayers to file
complete and accurate returns." Id. at 229; see also Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D.
437 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556 (S.D.N.Y.
1964). "If the statements [contained in the tax returns] may be used against the
reporters, they may in some degree be discouraged from making full and true
reports." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 273 (3d ed. 1984). In recognition of this policy,
unauthorized disclosure of tax return information is prohibited by federal law. 26
U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1), (2), (3). Unauthorized disclosure of tax returns and return
information by federal and state employees and other persons is a felony punishable
upon conviction by a fine in any amount not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment
of not more than 5 years or both, together with the costs of prosecution. Id.
Courts, while acknowledging the importance of this interest in confidentiality,
have refused to grant tax return information a "general privilege" against disclosure.
Premium Service Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir.
1975); Eastern Auto. Distribs., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 96 F.R.D.
147, 148 (E.D. Va. 1982); Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Cooper
v. Hallgarten & Co., 34 F.R.D. 482, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). Instead, tax returns
are entitled to a "qualified privilege." Eastern Auto. Distribs., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors
of Am., Inc., 96 F.R.D. 147, 148 (E.D. Va. 1982).
17. Eastern Auto. Distribs., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 96 F.R.D.
147, 148 (E.D. Va. 1982).
18. Where income is at issue, tax returns are both relevant and the best source
of information. Id.
19. See infra notes 70-164 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 43-69 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
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the securities laws. 2 After weighing the relevant policy considerations
on both sides,23 this Note will recommend that returns be admitted
24
during discovery and during the damages determination.
II. The Right to a Private Cause of Action
Under the Securities Laws
A tax shelter is a "security" for purposes of section 2(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act).25 While a promoter or offeror
of a tax shelter may seek an exemption from the registration requirement set forth in section 5 of the 1933 Act, 2 6 this exemption
does not relieve the promoter or offeror from civil liability under
the antifraud provisions 27 of the 1933 Act 28 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).2 9 The judicially created private cause
of action under federal law provides relief to investors in a tax

22. See infra notes 113-33 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 165-79 and accompanying text.
24. See infra Section VI.
25. "Security" includes any "certificate of interest or participation in any profit
sharing agreement [or] ... investment contract." 48 Stat. 77 (1933) (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1982)) [hereinafter referred to as the 1933 Act]. The term
investment contract is not defined by either the 1933 Act or the legislative reports.
However, the Supreme Court has defined the term as "a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
SEC
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party ......
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). With respect to a tax shelter,
"[i]f the promoters of a tax shelter deal offer investors the opportunity to share
in the profits . . . the promoters are . . . offering a security." HAFT & FASS, supra
note 1, at 3-2.
26. The offeror or promoter may seek, for example, the private offering exemption under § 4(2) of the 1933 Act or one of the exemptions contained in
Regulations A or D, promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission (17
C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.262 (1984) and 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-.505 (1984), respectively).
27. "[Exempted] transactions are not exempt from the antifraud, civil liability,
or other provisions of the federal securities laws." Preliminary notes to Regulation
D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (1984).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77/ (1982). Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act prohibits making an
offer or sale "by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes
an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 771(2).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984),
promulgated under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No.
291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)) [hereinafter referred
to as the 1934 Act], prohibits employment of "any manipulative or deceptive
device," and applies to all transactions involving a security, regardless of their
registration status under the 1933 Act. See HAFT & FASS, supra note 1, at 3-26.
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shelter or other security who are injured as a result of any fraudulent
misrepresentation or omission in the transaction.3"
The right to a private cause of action under the securites laws,
32
first recognized in 1946, 31 has been affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The action was created to provide plaintiffs with a mechanism to
seek compensation for injuries sustained as a result of violations of
the securities laws,33 and is implied from the purpose behind the

securities laws-the " 'protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve
'3 4
that result."
After the private cause of action was recognized, the federal courts
formulated the elements that a plaintiff would have to prove in
order to recover for a fraudulent sale of securities35 under Rule lOb37
536 These can now be stated in "black letter fashion:"

(1) a misstatement or omission38
39
(2) of a material fact

(3) made with scienter 4°

4
(4) on which plaintiff relied '
42
(5) that proximately caused his injury.

30. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).
31. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (cited with
approval in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13
n.9 (1971)).
32. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); J.1. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
33. The action is limited to actual purchasers and sellers of securities and does
not allow recovery for "intangible economic injury such as loss of a noncontractual
opportunity to buy or sell ......
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 734 (1975).
34. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
35. See, e.g., Simpson v. Southeastern Inv. Trust, 697 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir.
1983); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591
(3d Cir. 1976); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
36. While section 12(2) of the 1933 Act (15 U.S.C. § 77/(2)) is often asserted
as a basis for a cause of action for fraud in the offer or sale of securities, most
litigation centers on Rule lOb-5 as the primary basis for recovery. See DOBBS,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES 613 (1973). This Note will focus on Rule
lOb-5, but will refer to section 12(2) where appropriate.
37. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th Cir. 1981).
38. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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A. The elements of a Private Cause of Action
1. Misrepresentation or Omission

Rule lOb-5 prohibits the misstatement of a material fact or the
omission of a material fact which tends to make the statement
misleading. 43 Although either a misrepresentation or omission triggers
liability, the standard of proof necessary to sustain a cause of action
44
is greater for a misrepresentation than for an omission.
2. Materiality
To give rise to a cause of action for fraud under the securities

4
laws, the misrepresentation or omission must be of a material fact. 1
A material fact is defined as one which "a reasonable [investor] would
consider ... important. '" 46 The fact need not be the determinative
factor in making the investment decision but rather one which "would

have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
'
altered the 'total mix' of information made available.

47

3. Scienter

After reviewing Congressional intent in the legislative history of
the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v.
43. See supra note 29 for the text of Rule lOb-5. Section 12(2) also prohibits
a misstatement or omission of a material fact in registration statements. See supra
note 23 for the text of section 12(2).
44. In lOb-5 cases involving a material omission, positive proof of reliance is
not a prerequisite to recovery. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 153 (1972). If the omission is material, reliance is presumed. Id. at 153-54.
See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of reliance. See also
Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule Iob-5, 88
HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975) (discussion of Affiliated Ute and its effect on the elements
needed to prove fraud under Rule lOb-5).
45. See supra note 23 for the text of section 12(2) of the 1933 Act (15 U.S.C.
§771(2)). See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976);
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); Schlick v.
Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
976 (1975); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1966).
46. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. at 449. This case was
brought for fraud in a proxy statement under Rule 14a-9 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a9). However, the test for materiality stated by the Supreme Court is the one used
in all actions brought under the securities laws. Loss, FRAUD: AND CIVIL LIABILITY
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 11 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Loss]; see
Simpson v. Southeastern Inv. Trust, 697 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1983).
47. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see
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Hochfeldee 8 held that since section 10(b) was addressed to transactions involving some element of scienter, 49 a private cause of action
brought under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 would not lie absent
an allegation of scienter.1 To establish scienter, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant had knowledge that his statements were
5
false or misleading" or that he acted recklessly2.
Negligence alone,
however, is not sufficient." In determining whether the defendant
should be charged with scienter, the test is whether the information
necessary to make the statement true reasonably could have been
obtained

4

4. Reliance
For a plaintiff to recover in a Rule lOb-5 action, he must prove
that he either relied on the fraudulent statement," or exercised due
diligence 6 in researching the investment offer. The reliance requirement prevents the cause of action from being merely an enforcement
mechanism against violations of the securities laws5 7 by requiring

Project, Recent Developments in Securities Law: Causes of Action under Rule lObS, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 505, 516-23 (1976) (discussion of materiality) [hereinafter
cited as Recent Developments].
48. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
49. Id. at 201.
50. Id. at 202; see also, Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980) (scienter is
necessary element of cause of action for violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
51. "The term 'scienter,' as applied to conduct necessary to give rise to an
action for civil damages under [the] Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule lOb5 refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
BLACK'S LAW DicTioNARY 1207 (5th ed. 1979); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
52. Keirnan v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1980).
53. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). "lTlhe judicially created
private damages remedy under § l0b ... cannot be extended, consistently with
the intent of Congress, to actions premised on negligent wrongdoing." Id. at 210.
54. Kiernan v. Homeland, Inc., 611 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1980); see Loss,
supra note 46, at 19-21; see also Recent Developments, supra note 47, at 543-52.
55. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
911 (1977).
56. Id. at 1014.
57. Id. at 1016; Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596 (3d Cir. 1976).
Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission in the exercise
of its broad enforcement powers and it allows the Commission to bring an action
against the perpetrator of fraud and punish him appropriately, but it does not
establish prerequisites for recovery of damages by victims of stock fraud. Dupuy
v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1013. The private cause of action was established for the
purpose of compensating victims for losses resulting from violations of the securities
laws. Id. at 1013; see J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
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the plaintiff to prove that the fraudulent statement, which is the
subject of the litigation, was a causal link in the chain of injury. 8
Without positive proof that the plaintiff's injury resulted directly
from the fraud, any recovery would serve only to punish the defendant and to provide a windfall to the plaintiff. The plaintiff must
prove that he invested in reliance on the statement, thus making it
the proximate cause of his injury. 9
The plaintiff's duty of due diligence, sometimes treated as a
separate element, 6" was added in recognition of the "policies underlying the federal securities laws, and the judicially created causes
of action, where encouragement of watchfulness in the marketplace
has obvious benefits. ' ' 6' If, in the exercise of due care, the plaintiff

fails to discover the fraud and continues to invest, he has established

grounds upon which a court can award a recovery. 62
The due diligence requirement is highly subjective in nature. 63 The
standard of care imposed on the plaintiff is that of the reasonable

person with the attributes of the plaintiff.64 Courts readily acknowledge that different parties, with varying investment experience, should
be held to different levels of care when investigating investment
offers. 65 "The principle consideration should be whether the plaintiff,

58. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1016. If the fraudulent statement induced
the plaintiff to invest where he ordinarily would not have, there is a sufficient
causal link to prove reliance. Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705,
708 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980). "[If] the misrepresentation was
such as to induce both their purchases and their holding of the securities, their
holding and its duration determined the extent of their losses." Id. at 708; see
also Recent Developments, supra note 47, at 523.
59. Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d at 708; see also Recent
Developments, supra note 47, at 531-42 (discussion of causation).
60. The Fifth Circuit treats due diligence as a separate requirement. Dupuy v.
Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1014; see Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine, 434 F.2d
100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); accord Bird v. Ferry, 497
F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1974), Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1974); see also
Note, The Due Diligence Requirement for Plaintiffs under Rule lOb-5, 1975 DUKE
L.J. 753, 760-61 [hereinafter cited as Due Diligence].
61. Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc., 540 F.2d 591, 597 (3d. Cir. 1976).
62. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1014. "[Gleneral principles of equity suggest
that only those who have pursued their own interests with care and good faith
should qualify for the judicially created private lob-5 remedies." Id. at 1014.
63. Id. at 1016, 1023.
64. Id. at 1017. Among the attributes considered are: (1) the existence of a
fiduciary relationship; (2) concealment of the fraud; (3) opportunity to detect it;
(4) position in the industry; (5) sophistication and expertise in the financial community; and (6) knowledge of related proceedings. Id. at 1016.
65. Id. at 1017; Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc., 540 F.2d 591, 598 (2d Cir.
1976); see Due Diligence, supra note 60, at 779.
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by virtue of his position, has access in fact to the particular information needed to uncover the fraud." This "floating standard"
was introduced to implement the securities laws' goal of promoting
investor responsibility in making investment decisions. 67
5. Injury
As a precondition to sustaining a cause of action under Rule lOb5, the plaintiff must also prove that he was injured in fact, or
suffered actual harm as a result of the defendant's misrepresentation
or omission. 6 This requirement is in keeping with the primary purpose
69
of the cause of action: to provide compensation for injury.
III.

Defendant's Need for Plaintiff's Tax Returns to Refute the
Elements of the Cause of Action

The plaintiff's tax returns would prove to be highly useful to the
defendant at the discovery stage in refuting the plaintiff's assertions
relating to the elements of a cause of action. Specifically, they would
70
enable the defendant to undercut the plaintiff's claims of materiality,
reliance7 ' and due diligence. 72

Discovery rules appear to favor granting a party's request for
discovery of tax returns. 73 However, social policy interests favor
66. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1022.
67. See TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976). The
broad remedial purpose of the Securities Acts is to "ensure disclosures by corporate
management in order to enable the shareholders to make an informed choice."

Id.
68. Shapiro v. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., 626 F.2d 63, 69 (8th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1079 (1981). "[Djamages for securities fraud are
determined in accordance with the extent to which false and misleading information
actually harmed the complaining party." Id.
69. The compensatory nature of the action is clearly evidenced from the fact
that the damage is measured by fair market value of what plaintiff received and
what would have been received absent fraudulent conduct. See Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 102425 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977).
70. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
72. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
73. Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1), states: "In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery
or to the claim or defense of any other party..... " The policy is to provide
discovery into a broad range of matters that will assist a party in preparing a case

for litigation. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2007, at 37-38 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]; see also General
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recognizing the need for privacy of tax return information. 74 Although
courts have declined to grant an absolute privilege against disclosure
of tax returns," they "have recognized that interests in privacy
may call for a measure of extra protection. ' 7 6 This may be accomplished, in each case, by examining the purpose for which the returns
are sought and by determining whether this policy will be thwarted.
Another method of protecting the returns has been to recognize a
"qualified privilege, ' 77 which requires the party seeking discovery
to prove not only relevance, but that the information sought is not
readily obtainable from any other sources.78

An analysis of the need for income tax returns in an action for
damages against the offeror or promoter of a tax shelter for fraud

Tel. & Elecs. Laboratories, Inc. v. National Video Corp., 297 F. Supp. 981, 984
(N.D. Ill. 1968) ("Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for the broadest possible
discovery and courts have consistently so maintained"). In fact, courts have construed this rule as "envision[ing] generally unrestrictive access to sources of information." Horizons Titanium Corp. v. Norton Co., 290 F.2d 421, 425 (1st Cir.
1961); see also Grauer v. Schenley Products Co., 26 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1938)
(providing that the information sought is relevant to the subject matter of the
litigation). In defining what the requirements of relevancy entail, Wright & Miller
state that "it is not too strong to say that a request for discovery should be
considered relevant if there is any possibility that the information sought may be
relevant to the subject matter of the action." WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, § 2008,
at 46-47.
One limitation to this extensive grant of accessibility, stated in the rule itself,
is that privileged information is outside the scope of discovery ("any matter, not
privileged . . ."). FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Confidential information, however, is
not given this statutory protection. Luey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 632,
636 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (matters must be privileged to be outside the scope of
discovery, confidential matters are not excluded). Those seeking to deny disclosure
of particular information must turn to the judiciary for protection. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b) 1970 Amendment Advisory Committee Notes ("Rule 26(c) [FED R.
Civ. P. 26(c)] confers broad powers on the courts to regulate or prevent discovery
even though the materials sought are within the scope of 26(b), and these powers
have always been freely exercised."); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra, at 47 ("If
protection [from disclosure] is needed, it can better be provided by the discretionary
powers of the court ... ").
74. Premium Service Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 229
(9th Cir. 1975); Eastern Auto. Distribs., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 96
F.R.D. 147, 148 (E.D. Va. 1982); Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 438 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Cooper v. Hallgarten & Co., 34 F.R.D. 482, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
75. Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Houlihan v. AndersonStokes, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 232, 234 (D.D.C. 1978); Cooper v. Hallgarten & Co., 34
F.R.D. 482, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
76. FED R. Civ. P. 26(b) 1970 Amendment Advisory Committee Notes.
77. Eastern Auto. Distribs., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 96 F.R.D.
147, 148 (E.D. Va. 1982).
78. Id. at 148-49.
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under Rule lOb-5 entails balancing the factors favoring their use
against the plaintiff's interest in confidentiality. If the returns are
found to be uniquely relevant to the cause of action or, alternatively,
disclosure in this instance does not thwart the policy upon which
confidentiality is based, the returns should be disclosed.
The plaintiff's tax returns are vital to the defendant's efforts to
refute the allegations against him. The returns provide valuable
information regarding the plaintiff's level of sophistication as an
investor, which is relevant to the issues of due care 9 and materiality
of the fraud. 0 By revealing what plaintiff's tax liability would be
without any methods of sheltering income, the tax returns may also
reveal plaintiff's motivations for investing, which is relevant to the
81
reliance element.
In addition, the returns will indicate the effect the investment had
on the plaintiff's tax liability, which will impact on the injury issue.8"
Withholding the tax returns would result in an incomplete understanding of the transaction in question. As one court aptly stated:
"[r]equiring the jury or this Court to try this case without reference
to the tax consequences of the transaction would be requiring the
jury and the Court to live in an artificial 'never-never land' ...
[It would be] tantamount to requesting this Court and the jury to
try this case blindfolded." 8 3
A study of the plaintiff's tax returns would provide information
as to the extent of his experience as an investor.8 4 Congress promulgated the securities laws to protect innocent investors against
injury resulting from uninformed investment decisions. 5 Consequently, there are rigorous registration8 6 and reporting" requirements

79. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
83. Bridgen v. Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048, 1061 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
84. Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
85. "The basic objective of the Securities Act is the protection of the public
and securities investors by requiring ... full disclosure of information thought
necessary to informed investment decisions .... A further objective of the Act is
to protect honest enterprise . . .from the competition of securities offered to the
public pursuant to misrepresentations and fraudulent promotion .......
69 AM.
JUR. 2D Securities Regulation-Federal § 13 (1964); see also SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
86. For registered offerings under section 5 of the Act, 48 Stat. 77 (1933)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1982)), the offeror must comply with the stringent
requirements set out in Schedule A.
87. The 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982)),
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for publicly-held securities and less stringent requirments for private
companies"8 and limited offerings.8 9 Underlying these distinctions,
which take into consideration the relative sophistication of the investor, 90 is the recognition by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
that a sophisticated investor needs less protection than a novice. 91
In determining whether the allegedly injured investor was afforded
the degree of disclosure appropriate for his level of experience, the
trier-of-fact should examine all evidence relating to the investor's
experience, including information contained within the tax returns.
A sophisticated investor would be aware of the types of claims made
by promoters, be able to assess the degree to which they could be
trusted, and know the means by which claims could be investigated,
and, therefore, should be held to a higher level of care.92 The more
sophisticated the investor, the more likely it is that he at least had
constructive knowledge of the fraud, that is, with reasonable investigation he could have uncovered the fraud, and the less likely
it is that he will be able to establish a cause of action. 93 If the
investor invests in a project with knowledge that a statement in the
prospectus or offering memoranda is fraudulent, the element of
materiality is undercut. 94 Similarly, where a party has constructive
knowledge of the fraud, he should be denied a recovery for failure
to exercise due diligence. 9 Furthermore, if the returns provide evidence suggesting that the investor has extensive experience with tax

regulates the trading of securities on the market and requires continuous reporting
of information necessary to keep investors informed.
88. The private offering exemptions are contained in section 4(2) (15 U.S.C. §
77(d)(2)), section 4(6) (15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(6)) and Rule 506 (17 C.F.R. § 230.506)
(1985).
89. Limited offering exemptions are contained in Regulations A, 17 C.F.R. §
230.251-.263, and Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504-.506.
90. "Actually, no cases appear to have arisen involving the duty of sophisticated
plaintiff investors to apply their common sense in interpreting information supplied
to them in a securities transaction. Undoubtedly, however, placing such a burden
on sophisticated investors would be reasonable." Due Diligence, supra note 60, at
779, n.132.
91. The exemptions contained in Regulation A and Regulation D for small or
private offerings recognize that registration of certain types of offerings are not
necessary to protect investors in these types of offerings since the offering or sale
of securities is limited to the type of investor who has a greater level of sophistication
and experience in making investment decisions or who has particular knowledge
in the specific area of securities being offered. 69 AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation-

Federal § 49.
92. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
93. See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596-97 (3d Cir. 1976).
94. Id. at 596. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text for a discussion
of materiality.
95. Straub, 540 F.2d at 596-97; see supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
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shelters, a court could find that the investor actually knew that the
transaction would fail to produce any future income and that the
investor invested merely to reduce his tax liability. 96 Such investments
constitute "abusive tax shelters," an abuse of the tax laws that the
97
Internal Revenue Service seeks to prevent.
While an individual's tax returns cannot provide conclusive evidence of tax shelter abuse, a pattern of unsuccessful investments
could alert a court to the possibility of abuse and lead to prosecution.
An investor should not be able to assert the privilege of confidentiality
to shield wrongful investments. Moreover, an investor who has
entered into an investment with dubious belief in the probability of
it generating any income should be precluded from claiming damages
when the investment actually fails to produce income.
One court argues that by furnishing data on the plaintiff's income
level and tax bracket, tax returns also indicate the usefulness of the
particular tax shelter to the plaintiff. 9 This information could be
used to establish plaintiff's motivation in making the investment. 99
If the defendant were able to prove that the plaintiff's primary
motivation for making the investment was to obtain tax benefits,' °°
he would succeed in defeating plaintiff's cause of action; the causal
link between the fraud and the injury would be eradicated, and the
plaintiff would have failed to prove reliance. 10 1
In order to recover any money damages, plaintiff must show
positive proof of injury resulting from the fraud. 02 The first measure
of the investment's success is the amount of the deductions created
by losses in the venture. 03 Here, too, tax returns are relevant since

96. See New York Times, October 1, 1984, at Dl, col. 1.
97. Id. at DI, col. 1 ("The Government regards as abusive the shelters that
promise immediate deductions . . . especially if the venture seems to have little
prospect of earning profits").
98. Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
99. Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 836 (9th Cir. 1984); Bridgen v.
Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048, 1062 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
100. The value to an investor of a tax deduction is so great that damages are
recoverable under the securites laws, where, because of fraud by the offeror, tax
write-offs, taken by the investor, are disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service.
See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 938 (1982).
101. If, because of the fraud, plaintiff is denied the tax benefits, he will be able
to recover since the statement that was fraudulent was relied upon when making
the purchase. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
103. Because of the expectancy of this type of benefit, "the investor normally
pays a higher price for a tax shelter investment than for one involving simply
future growth or income." William Z. Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d
935, 940 (2d Cir. 1984).
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they will show what the net outcome of the transaction was.' °, If
the benefits from the reductions outweighed the losses, no injury
occurred, and therefore, no recovery can be awarded.10 5
Once the relevance of the tax returns has been established, the
party seeking disclosure of the returns must show that there is a
compelling need for the returns to be produced, i.e., that the information contained within them is not readily obtainable from other
sources.' °0 In an early case, the court held that the plaintiff's availability for questioning about the information contained in his tax
return precluded forcing disclosure of the returns. 07 The efficacy of
such interrogation is questionable. As indicated by later cases, questioning the taxpayer is clearly inferior to gleaning the information
directly from the source, that is, the tax returns. 0 Tax returns would
furnish the court with relevant data relating to the issues under
consideration. Moreover, producing the tax returns would not thwart
the public policy against disclosure. This policy was instituted to
encourage accurate reporting of all income.'0 9 The purpose of disclosure in this instance is to examine the amount of the deduction.
The incentive to show this deduction is not discouraged by disclosure." 0
IV.

The Need for Tax Return Information to Determine
Damages

Assuming that the information contained in the plaintiff's tax
returns was insufficient to defeat his cause of action, damages"' for

104. Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D 437, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

105. There must be some out-of-pocket loss, i.e., injury, for plaintiff to recover.
See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
106. Eastern Auto. Distribs., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc., 96 F.R.D.
147, 148 (E.D. Va. 1982); Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
107. Cooper v. Hallgarten & Co., 34 F.R.D. 482, 484-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).

108. Bridgen v. Scott, 456 F. Supp. 1048, 1061-62 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Smith v.
Bader, 83 F.R.D. at 439.
109. See supra note 66 and accompanying text; Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. at
439.
110. Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 232, 234 (D.D.C. 1978);

Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. at 439.
Ill. "[Tlhe main purpose of the damages award is some rough kind of compensation for the plaintiff's loss." D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REMEDIES
136 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS]. Any opportunity the plaintiff has to minimize
his losses should be reflected in the damage award so that all economic waste is
avoided. Application of this rule has the "further effect of excluding any recovery
that would be deemed economically wasteful." Id. at 189. Thus, "[w]here the
defendant's tortious misconduct causes damages, but also operates directly to confer
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plaintiff's losses must be determined. 1 2 Since the award for damages
for fraud under the securities laws is discretionary and a definitive
formula for damages for fraudulent tax shelters has not been established,"1 3 plaintiff's tax returns present issues of material fact and
4
should be admitted.1
some benefit upon the plaintiff, the plaintiff's claim for damages may be diminished
by the amount of the benefit received." Id. at 181. A caveat to this is that reducing
the damage award should be "done, however, only where it is 'equitable.' " Id.
112. "The question of liability and relief are separate. Therefore, a finding that
the defendant is liable does not resolve the issue of the proper remedy." 5B A.
JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10B-5, § 259, at 11-5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
JACOBS].

113. In a common law action for fraud in a bargaining transaction, two general
principles of damages are in use. The most common is the benefit of the bargain
rule, entitling the plaintiff to recover the difference between the actual value of
the property, and the value he would have received absent the misrepresentation.
This rule puts him in the same position he would have been in had the fraudulent
misrepresentations actually been true. DOBBS, supra note 111, at 594-95. The second
measure, which is a restitutionary measure, allows the plaintiff to recover the
difference between the amount paid for the item and its actual value. This approach
is designed to return the plaintiff to the same financial position he was in before
the transaction occurred, and is called the "out-of-pocket" measure. Id. at 595.
This approach is generally used in securities fraud litigation because recovery is
keyed to plaintiff's injury rather than to disgorge defendant's benefit. JACOBS,
supra note 112, § 260.03[a], at 11-15 (1980). A third approach, enabling a court
to accomplish substantial justice, allows for flexibility in the measuring of damages
by permitting the court to examine the specific facts of the case at bar. DOBBS,
supra note Ill, at 596. This is the approach that should be taken in securities
litigation because courts should have discretion to choose the remedy best suited
to the harm. This method is most likely to yield results consistent with the purpose
of the securities laws, which is to protect individuals from loss in the securities
market. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). Furthermore, "overwhelming liability [that may accompany a benefit of the bargain remedy] may
adversely affect members of the very class to be protected, that is, innocent
investors." DOBBS, supra note I l, at 615. For this reason, even where a rescissionary
measure of damages is applied, "[tihe actual damages principle requires that a
rescissional . . . award be 'reduced by any value received as a result of the
fraudulent transaction.' " Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 181 (8th Cir.
1982); see also JACOBS, supra note 102, § 260.03[a], at 11-15 (1980). Courts have
applied different methods to arrive at the damage figure. See infra notes 115-18
and accompanying text. The inconsistency in the cases stems from the fact that
the whole area of damages under Rule lob-5 is in dispute. In fact, "there has
been so much variation in the cases that it is tempting to conclude that '[t]here
is no law of damages under Rule 10b-5,-that the courts have taken an ad hoc
approach and that, broadly using the common law out-of-pocket measure as an
initial reference point, the appellate courts have exercised the discretion traditionally
left to the trial courts in finding damages appropriate to the facts of the case."
2 Federal Securites Code 789 (quoting Note, Measurement of Damages in Private
Actions Under Rule lOb-5, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 165, 179).
114. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168 (1982). The defendant's argument,
that "the evidence [of tax benefit is] crucial to the issue of whether plaintiffs,
regardless of whether they had been defrauded, suffered any actual damages," was
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The compensatory theory"' of recovery for fraud" 6 under the
securities laws" 7 limits the plaintiff's recovery to the extent defendant's violation "actually harmed" him." 8 Once the plaintiff establishes that the defendant knowingly" 9 made a material 20
misrepresentation or omission' 2' upon which plaintiff relied 22 and
which injured him,' 23 the question of damags must be considered.
In fraud cases under the securities laws, where a party sues for
rescissionary damages, 24 the plaintiff's recovery is limited to his net
26
economic loss' 25 in the transaction.

accepted by the court, and the case was remanded for further hearings on the
issue of damages. Id. at 182. Plaintiffs/Investors had sued the individual and
corporate defendants for fraud in the offering memorandum under Rule lob-5 and
section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and state anti-fraud laws. The individual defendant
was the offeror of a partnership interest in a real estate venture which would
"operate as a tax shelter leading to significantly greater returns for persons in
relatively high income brackets." Id. at 173.
115. "One who suffers a legally recognized injury is usually entitled to an award
of damages ....
The damages award is substitutionary relief, that is, it gives the
plaintiff money mainly by way of compensation, to make up for some loss that
... ordinarily may be measured in money." DOBBS, supra note 111, at 135.
116. A fraudulent representation "invades the economic interests of the deceived
person." Id. at 591.
117. The statutory liability for fraud in the prospectus or offering statement is
contained in section 12(2) and provides for recovery of "the consideration paid
for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of such security, or for
damages if he no longer owns the security." 48 Stat. 77 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 771 (1982)). This provision contemplates rescission and restitution as the basic
remedy and limits the recovery of damages to situations where the purchaser no
longer owns the security. DOBBS, supra note 11l, at 613. Section 28(a) of the 1934
Act, ch. 404, § 28, 48 Stat. 903 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982)),
provides relief for actual damages suffered by an investor as a result of wrongs
committed in violation of the 1934 Act. The purpose is to compensate civil plaintiffs
for economic loss. Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1981).
118. Shapiro v. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., 626 F.2d 63, 69 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1079 (1980).
119. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 172 (8th Cir. 1982).
125. "Net economic loss is defined as that loss stemming from the substance
of the fraud, not including those losses arising from non-fraud related factors.
This definition is consistent with the purpose of these measures-'to calculate the
amount of damages based upon [those] losses that are truly attributable to the
fraud.' " Note, Rule lOb-5 Damage Computation: Application of Financial Theory
to Determine Net Economic Loss, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 838, 850 (1981).
126. Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 470 F. Supp. 509, 516 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1011 (1980).
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In determining the plaintiff's net economic loss, the court should
consider all benefits received as a result of the transaction 27 in
addition to all expenses and losses. 28 In securities fraud cases, the
out-of-pocket measure 29 is used to arrive at net economic loss 3 °
because of the policy of compensating for injuries sustained, 3 ' rather
than awarding the expectancy interest'3 2 of the investor. Damages
are measured by the difference between the purchase price of the
security and its actual value on the date of purchase.' 33
An investor in a tax shelter clearly may have something of value
in the form of deductions because of the investment's unique tax
treatment 3 4 even where the transaction fails to generate profits.' 35
If the investor has a cause of action against the offeror or promoter
for fraud, the actual damages view of damage recovery will allow
the court to factor in this benefit in determining the amount of the
recovery. 3 6 The argument that the benefit derives from a collateral
127. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 181 (8th Cir. 1982); Garnatz v. Stifel,
Nicolaus and Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951
(1978); see JACOBS, The Measure of Damages in Rule JOb-5 Cases, 65 GEO. L.J.
1093, 1159-60 (1977).
128. Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1011 (1980).
129. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 125, for a definition of net economic loss.
131. Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1981).
132. See supra note 113, for a defintion of the benefit of the bargain, which
is the expectancy interest.
133. Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); Bonime v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (S.D.N.Y.)
(Sneed, J., concurring in result in part), aff'd, 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1976); Green
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1345 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 924 (1977). "The traditional measure of damages in lob-5 actions is the
out-of-pocket measure. It has been classified as a restitutionary measure." JACOBS,
supra note 112, § 260.03[c][ii], at 11-23.
134. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 182 (8th Cir. 1982); see Incentive
to Sue, supra note 8, at 672-73.
135. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d at 182. The value to an investor of a
tax deduction is so great that damages are recoverable under the securities laws
where because of fraud by the offeror, tax write-offs taken by the investor are
disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649
F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982). The benefit that inures
to real estate tax shelter investors is even greater than other investments. Because
the "at risk" rules of a real estate tax shelter are generous, the investor is not
limited to the amount of his investment in deducting losses. Rather, he may include
the amount of the financing in his basis, and may create deductions far exceeding
his initial investment. This acts as an incentive to choose real estate tax shelters
over other types of shelter investments when making investment decisions. Austin
v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d at 173-74; see also BITTKER & STONE, supra note 1, at
649; Incentive to Sue, supra note 8, at 672-73 (1977).
136. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text. Harris v. American Inv.
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source'317 is incorrect. An offer to invest in a tax shelter is promoted
by providing offerees with information regarding tax incentives. 3 '
The venture, which usually requires a greater financial outlay than
other forms of securities in anticipation of the added benefit, 3 9

constitutes one integrated transaction.'

40

Since the tax benefit does

not have an independent source, 41 the loss claimed should be reduced
by the amount of the benefit to arrive at net out-of-pocket loss. 42
The tax benefit rule, 43 relied on by parties opposing consideration

of deductions,'" is inapposite.

5

The rule asserts that any funds

Co., 523 F.2d 220, 225 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976); Bonime
v. Doyle, 416 F. Supp. 1372, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 554 (2d Cir.
1977).
137. Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). In
this action for fraudulent sale of securities in an oil participation, the court held
that consideration of the tax benefits produced to reduce the damage recovery was
inappropriate. "[lit would be a great 'injustice' to plaintiff to reduce such damages
for extraneous reasons wholly unconnected with the acts of defendants." Id. at
558. The collateral source rule states that "benefits received by the plaintiff from
a source collateral to the tortfeasor or contract breacher may not be used to reduce
the defendant's liability for damages. This rule holds even though the benefits are
payable to the plaintiff because of the defendant's actionable conduct and even
though the benefits are measured by the plaintiff's losses." DOBBS, supra note 111,
at 185.
138. Austin 11, 768 F.2d at 956; Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir.
1982). The Securities Exchange Commission has recognized that tax benefits are
an inextricable aspect of tax shelters and requires issuers to disclose the prospective
tax benefits that might be realized from the investment. William Z. Salcer v.
Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 942 (2d Cir. 1984).
139. William Z. Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 940 (2d Cir.
1984); see supra note 103.
140. Id. at 941-42. The court rejected the argument that the benefits derived
from a reduction in tax liability come from a collateral source. The "collateral
source rule" prohibits considering benefits received from third parties as a result
of "wholly separate and distinct transactions." Id. at 941. The essence of the rule
is the independence of transactions which is not present in this case, since the
benefits "emanate directy from the tax shelter sought by the plaintiffs and provided
by defendants, without which plaintiffs could not have realized any tax benefits."
Id. at 941-42.
141. The collateral source rule has no application except to collateral sources.
If the benefit derives from the defendant himself, or from a source identified with
him, he is entitled to credit for it. DOBBS, supra note I11, at 181-82.
142. See JACOBS, supra note 112, at 11-15. "Where the defendant's tortious
misconduct causes damages, but also operates directly to confer some benefit upon
the plaintiff, the plaintiff's claim for damages may be diminished by the benefit
received." DOBBS, supra note 111, at 181.
143. The tax benefit rule states that "when the earlier deduction [for losses]
resulted in a tax benefit the recovery is under general principles of tax law, included

in gross income in the year of recovery." 1 MERTENS
TAXATION § 7.37, at 130 (1981) [hereinafter cited as I

LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
MERTENS].

144. See, e.g., Western Federal Corp. v. Davis, 553 F. Supp. 818, 820 (D. Ariz.
1982); Cooper v. Hallgarten & Co., 34 F.R.D. at 482.
145. Austin H, 768 F.2d at 955; William Z. Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp.,
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received for losses previously deducted will be subject to taxation,' 46
thus making any apparent benefit "illusory. ' 1 47 This rule assumes
that the future tax treatment by the plaintiff of an undetermined
damage award can be predetermined.

48

The plaintiff, in fact, has

various options regarding treatment of the damages award and may
have other deductions or credits to offset the income, thereby avoiding taxation altogether.

49

The possibility of future taxation is too

remote to disregard the fact that tax benefits already have been
received. Therefore, this possibility should be discounted. 50
A more persuasive argument against using tax savings to reduce
the damage award is that the plaintiff received a benefit at the
expense of the government.' 5 ' By allowing the investor to deduct

the losses from his investment, the government is foregoing income
from taxation.5 2 Allowing the court to reduce the amount of the
recovery by the tax benefits derived arguably provides a benefit to
a defendant who ill deserves it.' Furthermore, one court has argued
744 F.2d at 943 (2d Cir. 1984).
146. 1 MERTENS, supra note 143, § 7.37.
147. Western Federal Corp. v. Davis, 553 F. Supp. 818, 820 (D. Ariz. 1982);
accord Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 1984).
148. There is some guidance for determining how to tax damage recoveries. "A
payment in settlement of a suit for rescission of a sale of stock, on the ground
that it was induced by fraud, was held to represent payment for the stock resulting
in capital gain and not ordinary income." 3B MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME

§ 22.93, at 631 (1980). However, the prospective and unsecured damage
recovery should not be relied on to offset a loss that has already been rightfully

TAXATION

deducted by the taxpayer since

[i]ncome accrues to a taxpayer when there arises in his favor a fixed

and unconditional right to receive it and there is a reasonable expectation
that this right will be converted into money or its equivalent .... An-

ticipated damages are not accruable in the year of breach or in the year
of commencement of litigation, except in the comparatively unusual case

where the taxpayer's rights are reasonably certain, the amount is ascer-

tainable and, ordinarily, has been accrued on the taxpayer's books.
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 12.65, at 243 (1983). Since the
damage award may not in fact accrue to the plaintiff, it is "jumping the gun"
to assume that itwill offset the earlier deduction.
149. William Z. Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 943 (2d Cir.
2 MERTENs

1984).
150. Id. at 943. The Eighth Circuit has noted the possibility that previous
deductions may be disallowed by later audits. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d
168, 183 (8th Cir. 1982). However, the court held that this does not foreclose
consideration of tax benefits. "Certainly the possibility that past tax deductions
will be disallowed is relevant to the determination of the extent of any benefit

actually received by plaintiffs from those deductions. The jury is entitled to determine

whether and to what extent there would be a disallowance of deductions." Id. at
183; accord Austin I, 768 F.2d at 955.
151. Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 1984).
152. Id. at 838.

153. Id.
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that subtracting the benefits would place an unfair burden on taxpayers generally, and would leave the government to absorb the cost

of defendant's fraud. 54 According to this view, the government
155
should not become "the banker for fraudulent tax shelter activity."'
This argument, however, overlooks the purpose behind the allowance
of tax shelters, which is to encourage private construction of projects
that may not have been undertaken without tax inducements. 5 6 The
project here, although perhaps unprofitable, already has been com51 7
pleted. Thus, the government has received what it "banked on.'
The injury sustained by the plaintiff, not the government, was
caused by the defendant. Yet it was also the defendant who provided

the opportunity to profit from liberal tax laws by performing necessary research, preparation and management of the project.'58 These
efforts should not be discounted when computing benefits and losses.

Courts have discretion to "fashion the remedy best suited to the
harm" inflicted where a cause of action is judicially created,'5 9 such
as the cause of action for securities fraud.

60

One federal court

devised an alternative to reducing the award by the amount of the
benefit.' 6' While rejecting the defendant's argument that it was entitled to credit for the tax deductions claimed by the plaintiffs, the

court nevertheless reduced the amount of prejudgment interest awarded
to reflect the plaintiff's ability to use the money not paid to the
Internal Revenue Service during the period in question.' 62 Although
this holding lacks internal consistency, the court's consideration of
the benefit to the plaintiffs of the use of the money was appropriate.
154. Id.; see also Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 588 F. Supp. 1257, 1260
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[Tihe losers would be the government and plaintiffs, and the
only winner would be defendants").
155. Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 1984).
156. Austin H, 768 F.2d at 956; William Z. Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp.,
744 F.2d at 941; Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d at 182; New York Times,
October 1, 1984, at DI, col. 1.
157. William Z. Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 941 (2d Cir.
1984).
158. Id. "To ignore the sizeable tax benefits actually realized by the plaintiffs
(through the work of defendants] would be unrealistic." Id. at 941; see also Austin
H, 768 F.2d at 956. But see Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, 588 F. Supp. 1257,
1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The decision in Freschi, to disallow evidence of tax benefits,
preceded that of William Z. Salcer v. Envicon, 744 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1984), which
came to the opposite conclusion.
159. Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
160. Id.
161. Western Federal Corp. v. Davis, 553 F. Supp. 818 (D. Ariz. 1982).
162. Id.; see New York Law Journal, April 20, 1983, at 1, col. 1 (discussion
of this case).
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Most importantly, mitigation conforms to the compensatory purpose
of the remedy. The limitation on damages contained in section 28
of the 1934 Acts precludes recovery "in excess of [the investor's]
actual damages on account of the act complained of [sic]. "'' 63 Whatever benefits plaintiff has received as a result of the transaction,
therefore, must be subtracted from the amount of the recovery to
arrive at the actual damages figure.164
V.

Policy Considerations

Several policy considerations militate against the use of tax returns
to determine whether the cause of action for a fraudulent tax shelter
investment has been established and, if appropriate, to calculate the
appropriate measure of damages. An examination of the consequences of disclosure, however, reveals that making tax returns
available promotes the applicable policy considerations.
One possible objection focuses on the confidentiality of tax returns. 65 Even though they are only protected by a qualified privilege,1 66 it may be argued that this privilege should not be lightly
waived in view of the underlying policy of encouraging honest
filing. 67 In the case of a party bringing an action for fraud against
the offeror of a tax-sheltered investment, however, disclosure will
not deter that party from filing complete and accurate tax information. The specific information being examined on the return is
the amount of the deduction. 61 In any circumstance, the taxpayer
will want to create the greatest deduction possible and, thus, will
have had no incentive to withhold relevant information.' 69 Furthermore, a confidentiality stipulation can be signed which will prevent

163. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982); see Osofsky v. Zipf, 645 F.2d 107, 111 (2d
Cir. 1981). Courts apply the actual damages concept contained in section 28(a) of
the 1934 Act to 1933 Act causes of action. See, e.g., Austin 11, 768 F.2d at 954.
164. Austin 11, 768 F.2d at 956. The purpose is to compensate plaintiffs, not
penalize defendants. Id.; William Z. Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d
at 940-41.
165. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the social
policy favoring confidentiality.
166. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
168. Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. 437, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
169. William Z. Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 944 (2d Cir.
1984). The purpose of a tax shelter is to offset other income with losses to reduce
tax liability. The court in this type of case is looking at the amount of the deduction
to mitigate the damage award. At the time of filing the returns it was in the
plaintiff's interest to report the greatest deduction possible. If the plaintiff were
to be deterred from accurately reporting the deduction by fear of disclosure, investing
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any dissemination of the disclosed information beyond that which
is necessary in the interest of justice. 70
Another possible argument against disclosing tax returns is that
innocent investors will bear a heavier burden of proof in establishing
the cause of action and may not be fully compensated for their
injuries. The floating nature of the due care requirement precludes
this outcome. 7 ' Innocent and inexperienced investors who invested
in good faith, believing that there was a valid economic purpose to
7
the venture, have a lesser burden of proof to establish fraud. 1
Disclosure of their tax returns is to their advantage, since it will
make it easier for them to support their claim of reliance by revealing
their relative lack of expertise. Disclosure will, simultaneously help
them recover the full measure of injuries sustained once they prove
fraud. The defendant must reimburse the investor for the full measure
of actual damages,' 71 the extent of which will become manifest only
by examining that party's tax returns.
Conversely, individuals who have made "sham" investments, that
is, who invested in a venture strictly for the tax deductions, knowing
that there was no valid economic purpose, or investors who should
have been able to discover the lack of potential for profits on their
4
investment from the outset should, in equity, be denied a recovery. 7
For this class of investors disclosure will thus serve two purposes:
it will discourage investment in abusive tax shelters and it will also
discourage frivolous claims. Upon learning that their tax returns will
be admitted into evidence, potential plaintiffs are likely to withdraw
their action if they know that the benefit received from the investment
far outweighs any injury suffered, or if they suspect that their returns
will expose them as sophisticated investors who were aware that
75
their investment was made primarily to reduce their tax liability.'
A final objection to introducing tax returns is that, to the extent
they reduce the amount of the damage award, defendants, offerors
in a tax shelter would have no value to him since the purpose is to create deductions.
See Smith v. Bader, 83 F.R.D. at 439.
170. Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1982).
171. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
172. See id.
173. See supra note 115-26 and accompanying text.
174. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977) (discussion of equitable nature of availability of this cause of action).
175. In fact, the plaintiff in William Z. Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744
F.2d at 938, stipulated that if he lost on defendant's motion to compel discovery
of plaintiff's tax returns, he would withdraw his lawsuit. It was for this reason
that the court granted a hearing on this interlocutory appeal.
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of fraudulent tax shelters, will be the beneficiaries. 76 This argument
is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the private cause
of action under the securities laws, which is intended not to serve
as an enforcement mechanism, but to compensate for harm caused. 77
That the offeror of the fraudulent tax shelter may end up paying
less does not necessarily mean that he will not be subject to any
further sanctions. Such offerors are still susceptible to suit by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, whose obligation it is to punish
offerors or promoters of fraudulent securities within the statutory
framework laid out by Congress.'7 8 Furthermore, it is not up to the
judiciary to increase the amount of damages to punish a defrauder;
79
rather, that is the perogative of the legislature.
VI.

Conclusion

The securities laws present a fertile ground for litigation by allegedly defrauded investors seeking to recover for their losses. While
claims of injury are often meritorious, there are distinct possibilities
for abuse of the judicially created cause of action. To the greatest
degree possible, these abuses should be limited. Where a recovery
is granted, however, it should not exceed the amount necessary to
compensate for losses-the "actual damages" figure. In an action
for a fraudulent sale of a tax shelter investment, tax returns should
be discoverable in order to fully explore plaintiff's claim of fraud.
Furthermore, tax returns clearly shed light on the degree to which
plaintiff was injured and therefore, should be considered when determining damages. Revealing the plaintiff's tax returns in an action
for fraud under Rule lOb-5 will do little harm to the purpose behind
the policy of confidentiality, but will greatly assist a court in rendering
a fair and just decision.
Risa A. Levine
176. See supra notes 151-58 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
178. 1934 Act, § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1982).
179. William Z. Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 941 (2d Cir.
1984) ("We are barred from engaging in judicial legislation by § 28(a) of the
Exchange Act, which limits plaintiffs to recovery of their actual net economic loss
and does not give us discretionary power to increase that amount ... ").

